RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

of

OREN EDWIN DEHAVEN, Lieutenant General

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 8 November 1924, South Haven, Michigan

YEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE: Over 34 years

DATE OF RETIREMENT: 1 September 1983

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

The Transportation School, Basic and Advanced Courses
The Command and General Staff College
The Industrial College of the Armed Forces

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

Eastern Michigan University - BS Degree - Economics
University of Tennessee - Graduate - Industrial Mob Tng Program

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF DUTY ASSIGNMENTS (Last 10 Years)

FROM	TO	ASSIGNMENTS
Aug 64	Aug 65	Chief, G-4 Plans Branch, HQs, 8th Army
Aug 65	Apr 66	Chief, Motor Transport Branch, USATCH
Apr 66	Aug 67	CO, 6th Trans Bn (Trk), USARV
Aug 67	Aug 69	Staff Off, Strat St and Mob Div, DCSOPS, DA
Aug 69	Aug 70	Student, Industrial College of Armed Forces
Jul 70	Jun 71	Commander, 54th Trans Grp, USARV
Jun 71	Aug 73	Chief, TC Branch, MILPERCEN, DA
Aug 73	Jul 75	Dir of Logistics, J-4, USREDCOM
Jul 75	Aug 77	Dir Trans, Energy and Trp Spt, ODCSLOG, DA

Sep 77	Aug 78	Asst DCSLOG, ODCSLOG, DA
Aug 78	Jul 79	CG, Ft Eustis, VA
Jul 79	Jul 81	CG, Ft Lee, VA
Jul 81	Sep 83	Dir of Logistics, J-4, OJCS, Wash, DC

PROMOTIONS	**DATES OF APPOINTMENT**
2LT	21 Dec 48
lLT	4 Aug 50
CPT	5 Mar 54
MAJ	17 May 61
LTC	26 May 65
COL	10 Dec 69
BG	20 Jul 73
MG	1 Sep 75
LTG	1 Jul 81

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit w/2 Oak Leaf Clusters
Bronze Star Medal w/Oak Leaf Cluster
Air Medal w/Oak Leaf Cluster
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal w/Oak Leaf Cluster
Navy Commendation Medal
Master Parachutist Badge

SOURCE OF COMMISSION OCS

INTERVIEW ABSTRACT

Interview with Lieutenant General (Ret) Oren E. DeHaven

CPT Donna Barbuschak interviewed Lieutenant General (Ret) Oren E. DeHaven in Williamsburg on 9 February 1985. A graduate of OCS in 1948, Lieutenant General DeHaven spent 35 years as an officer on active duty.

General DeHaven discussed his experiences as a commander at both battalion and group level in Vietnam, principally in relation to motivating his soldiers. The manner in which the military was re-supplied in Vietnam was also mentioned, especially the effect Vietnam had on U.S. Forces in USAREUR. Army readiness in terms of re-supply of basic item such as personal issue item was an area of concerned mentioned. If 250,000 personnel were mobilized, for example, General DeHaven pointed out there is no ability in current system to provide uniform, boots, etc.

The impact of separating the Transportation and Aviation branches was detailed, particularly, concerning the loss to transportation of many maintenance and supply experts.

Strategic ability and the factors affecting it, such as availability of trained personnel to load/unload cargo and the adequacy of port facilities, were addressed by General DeHaven. Planning considerations must examine capabilities other than the amount of aircraft, ships, and rail available to move cargo.

Logistical and support requirements in USAREUR today were examined, and the need for completion of the Central European Pipeline was addressed.

INTERVIEW

This is the Army Transportation Oral History interview conducted with LTG (Ret) Oren E. DeHaven on 9 February 1985 by Captain Donna A. Barbuschak at LTG DeHaven's home in Williamsburg, Virginia.

CPT Barbuschak: You commanded the 6th Transportation Battalion in Vietnam. There isn't a lot written on logistics in Vietnam. So I'd like to ask you a few questions about that.

LTG DeHaven: I thought General [LTG Joseph M.] Heiser wrote a very comprehensive story about logistics in Vietnam.

CPT Barbuschak: Yes**,** sir. It is the only thing written, unfortunately. What was the mission of the 6th Transportation Battalion?

LTG DeHaven: We were one of the two battalions in the 48th Transportation (3roup in Long Binh that is north of Saigon. We provided port clearance in Saigon at the port of Newport and provided direct support to the Infantry divisions and brigades that were in our military region which was Military Region III [MR III]. We also provided line-haul transportation to the out camps of the divisions, brigades, and to include the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment [ACR] that were located as far away as Ta Ninh province.

CPT Barbuschak: Did you experience any problems with command and control in Vietnam?

LTG DeHaven: We didn't have the greatest communications in the world at that tire because of the distances that we traveled. We used them internally in the convoys. I went to Vietnam with only a battalion headquarters that consisted of 38 people, a very small group. We assumed command of three companies right after we became operational which was within 14 days after we arrived. Without any equipment, we assumed operational readiness and control of those companies. When we finished within four months, I had command of 7 companies in the Battalion. We lived in the most austere conditions in tents. We didn't have the nicest facilities to live in. I was given an area within the greater compound that Long Binh had which was referred to as

"TC Hill" in the southwest corner of Long Binh. The group commander gave me this compound. He said, "That’s yours to do with what you want."

Fortunately, I went to pay a courtesy call on my old boss, MG [Frank] Miller, who was the Chief of Staff of USARV [U.S. Army Vietnam] at the time. He had been my boss the previous year when he was the DCSIOG [Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics] of 8th U.S. Army in Korea. I was the Chief of Plans in ODCSLOG [Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for logistics] 8th U.S. Army. He told m about all the grand and glorious things that they were going to do. I said, "Well, why don't you make us a guinea pig especially when the building comes along?" Through his influence, we went before the Planning Board at Long Binh and we received priority to get the pre-fabricated Butler buildings that we were going to have. At the first meeting that I had with my unit commanders, I said, "I'm going to ask everyone in the Battalion to provide one hour of their free tine every day to the Battalion Construction Program."

I had an outstanding S-4 by the name of CPT Harold Rodd. Harold designed what we were going to do. I gave tentative approval and then we got it approved by the Planning Board to construct an eight-company-size battalion area which we proceeded to do. When you can get a soldier to provide one hour of his free time, he normally will continue and provide one, two, or three hours. We had our own cemnt mixer which we had found. It was one that the French had used and the drum still worked on it. I had a mechanic by the nane of Paul rodds. I'll never for et his name. They attached a diesel engine to that thing, got it to work, and painted it yellow. Since they worked for CPT Rodd, they called it "Rodd's Rolls Royce." We poured probably five thousand cubic yards of concrete out of that little thing. To lay the foundations of the buildings, we needed a road paver that we got on a temporary basis. We made a lot of mistakes. But we built that area. When I left there, we had, I believe, 5 of the Company areas completed at the end of my tour plus the Battalion headquarters, the BOQ [Bachelor Officer's Quarters], the mss hall, all the supply facilities, and the recreation area. So the people were busy in that initial period and this is in 1966 and 1967.

Things were a little different. Most of the soldiers (I'd say all of them) had a mission. So we did not have a drug problem. The kids worked hard. We had their recreation facilities. Convoys were long and arduous and we provided 75 percent of our TOE [Table of Organization and Equipment] 7 days a week. I had the Commanding General of the 1st Logistics Command come out and say, "Well, you know 75 percent is not very much." He said, "I've been up to Cam Ranh Bay and the 'Transportation Group up there that was giving 100 percent of all the vehicles they had." I said, "Yes, sir. Can you tell m 100 percent of what?" I said, "We're putting 45 trucks on the road out of each company every day." When Colonel Sam Coggins, who was our (soup commander, came back from a staff meting four days later, he said that he had talked to General [LTG Charles W.] Eifler. General Eifler said to pass the word to m that he was satisfied with the 45 trucks a day that we were putting on the road because he found out that at Cam Ranh Bay, they were putting a 100 percent of 30 trucks a day on the road. It was going downhill from there.

We had some labor funds which were made available to us. We hired Vietnamese and we had a civilian dump truck company that Worked for us. Laterite is a very hard material which, when it's not wet, is almost like a blacktop. We built a battalion motor pool of this material. We had taken two large 150 IM [Kilowatt] generators with us to Vietnam and they served us well. We had most of the reasonable comforts that anybody could expect. I think that the soldiers really counted on that. They knew that they would have a decent place to get a shower and hot food when they got back from a mission. The days were long. They started at 0330 or 0400 and would return probably between 1630 to 1900 and then get up and do it all over again the next day, every day. But we tried to give our kids breaks. We made sure that everyone went on R&R [Rest & Recreation].

I thought that I had a pretty decent battalion. The morale was excellent. Our court-martial rate was the lowest. As a matter of fact, I think we only had one special court-martial in the whole year I was in Vietnam. We didn't have any drug problems probably because the kids were busy. We had draftees and we had few Regular Army soldiers. The senior NCOs [Noncommissioned Officers] were outstanding at operations and we had excellent officers. Some of them were brand new to the Army and some of them were old heads. Major Bob Metcalfe was my executive officer and Major Ted Isenberg was my S-3. He left just shortly after we got there because he had a greater expertise in terminals. I got Major Walt Daniels to come in to be my operations officer. All the Company commanders were great and the Platoon leaders were fine. As a matter of fact, of the Company commanders that I had in those days (I had nine Company commanders during the year I was there), six of them are Colonels now. Two have left the Army and one is a Lieutenant Colonel. They took care of their soldiers; their soldiers took care of them. They all worked hard. It was an enjoyable period because everyone had a mission. It wasn't that way when I cam back three years later. But that's a little different time period.

CPT Barbuschak: You also commanded the 54th General Support Group in 1970 and 1971. What was your mission and why) did you support?

LTG DeHaven: The General Support Group provided the supply and maintenance for the Military Region II [MR II] South. That's on a line generally from Ban Me Thut to the coast south to Phan Thiet and over to Bao Loc right on the II and III Corps boundary (40,000 square miles). We took care of all the Artillery and Task Force South which was the only maneuver unit in that region. We provided the supply, maintenance, and transportation for all of those units. We supported 27 Artillery battalions. We had the KEGE (indigenous) forces for the Vietnamese for which we provided support. We provided support to 100,000 Koreans and the entire Korean force that was there plus the air bases at Phan Rang and Nha Trang. Our transportation support came from the 124th Transportation Command. They provided the trucks except that I had the 5,000-gallon tanker companies in the 59th group. They were in my petroleum battalion. I had two maintenance battalions, two ammunition battalions, one supply and service battalion, and a petroleum operation battalion. We provided all classes of supply to everyone within that 40,000 square miles, either by air and/or by surface.

I think the most memorable event that took place is the day of the change of command. The first official act that I had to perform, after I took command of the group, was I went to a memorial ceremony for a young soldier that had a drug overdose. Drugs had become a real problem. When you have 7,400 soldiers and work for only about 3,000, an idle mind becomes the Devil's workshop. The drugs were available and they used them. So we started a rather large drug rehabilitation program and it worked. It worked for us because we had people that entered the program on a voluntary basis. We told them that once they were admitted, they had to stay in it for 30 days. Once they got in and found out that we kept them busy from the tine they got up in the morning until they were so exhausted they dropped in the evening, they wanted to get out. But we wouldn't let them. I had a fine young lieutenant and six NCOs running the program and we had never more than 14 people admitted into that program. We worked them hard. I've had several kids that wrote me letters afterwards. Some of them are now professional soldiers and two of them are officers. They talked about their days in that program and how they thought that it was probably the thing that turned them in the direction where they could best serve the Army.

But we were the first ones to volunteer to participate in a unit withdrawal program. I volunteered to lose a maintenance battalion, an ammunition battalion, and a supply and service battalion immediately. I wanted them out of there because we didn't have enough work for them to do. Then we expanded to take over parts of MR II North. In spite of the expansion, we still had the problem of not having enough to do and too many people to do it.

CPT Barbuschak: About what time period did this withdrawal program take place?

LTG DeHaven: It had started in the Fall of 1970 and each month, the Defense Department would announce the withdrawal of "VI number of people and equipment from Vietnam because of a new administration policy.

CPT Barbuschak: So this was Army-wide all over Vietnam?

LTG DeHaven: This was in Vietnam. We were sending divisions home and everything was leaving.

CPT Barbuschak: What did you see as the main problems with combat service support in Vietnam?

LTG DeHaven: I can't really tell you the main problem with combat service support in Vietnam. First, we provided almost too much luxury to the soldier in Vietnam and I don't mean that in a derogatory sense. First, we drained the rest of the Army to provide the support that we needed in Vietnam. GEN [Jams H.] Polk, Commander of United States Army Europe [USAREUR], had nothing with which to work. They had second lieutenants commanding companies. You might have a lieutenant colonel as a battalion commander. But he had no experience at all in his battalion. We had drained all that off and we were sending the experienced company commanders, the captains, to Vietnam.

We reduced the time in grade: one year in grade from Second Lieutenant to first and another year in grade, and you were a Captain. But that didn't provide the experience to the captain. All that did was provide you a whole bunch of captains and that, I think, was a drawback.

I was in the personnel business when I came home in 1971. As a matter of fact, I was in the personnel business when I care hone in 1967. I was Chief of Career Planning and Assignments. We would corn down and talk to every Basic Course and every Advanced Course, not only to the officers, but we'd talk to their wives, a very key element. We needed volunteers. We needed more voluntary-indefinite officers. We had carte blanche to take any officer that wanted to stay in beyond the ROTC graduate beyond his OBV-2 [Obligated Volunteer Officer - 2 years] or his two-year commitment.) What we would do was to try to send these kids to Europe for at least 18 months. But then what we did was we took the lieutenants that were in Vietnam and wrote each of them letters. We had reviewed all their files and we knew the good ones and we knew those that we thought had potential. We offered them a two-year assignment in Europe. Formally, you would come home if you were a Lieutenant. You would come home from Vietnam about your twentieth month of service.

A lot of kids took us up on it and we sent them directly to Europe. This provided the people in Europe with what we felt was a pool of experienced combat officers, something they hadn't had before. We were really chastised and criticized by the Chief of Officer Personnel Operations when he found out I had 120 captains in Europe. He really gave me trouble. He said, "You get those officers home and you get them to Vietnam." I said, "But they've already been there." He said, "Well?" Then we told him what we had done.

They would come back to the States for two years to do what? They would not do very much because they knew that if they stayed, they'd rotate and then they would go on back to Vietnam. But we promised them 2 years in Europe with their families and then it's a little more palatable if they had to go back on short tour again.

I think it worked out very well. Some of the other branches adopted that but, unfortunately, the area that we tried to gear the individual assignments to Europe to didn't work out. We wanted to send the senior lieutenants, about-to-be captains down to battalions to become XO's or as S-3's. But they were all siphoned off. We found they were being siphoned off at the headquarters of the divisions. But down at the battalion and company level, PFC Joe Schmedlap wasn't getting the guidance and the leadership he needed. He was still looking at this lieutenant who really was sort of searching his way for his own identity in the Army. That was one of the things that I think hindered us in the problem. But we found that once w started our program to send new officers to Europe (Second Lieutenants commanding companies), by the time we pulled them out of Europe and sent them to Vietnam, they had between 20 and 24 months and they had commanded companies. Some of them had been battalion S-3's or S-4's. They had a lot of experience and they went to Vietnam. I think, they performed in a superb manner.

The way Vietnam was at that time, we were first not prepared to fight a war. The way the country was laid out, a Transportation Command, initially, went to Vietnam and it commanded all the Transportation units in country. It's an impossibility to do that from Saigon in order to run the commands at Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Da Nang. They couldn't do it. So a year and a half later, they brought in the 5th, 125th, and 124th Transportation Command. Then they divided the country, generally, by regions and support commands. I think it worked out much better. We provided all of the necessary combat service support: Class I, II, III, IV, and V - all of it. I don't know of anyone that really went without fuel, ammunition, repair parts, and food any time that we were there. We had shower units and laundries. We had it all and I think we provided the finest service that we could to the soldiers that we had while we were in country.

There's always a breakdown sometime, I suppose. We had those like every other group. I particularly thought that this maintenance support given to aviation units in Vietnam was consistent. They had a pipeline, a closed-loop system, right back to St. Louis. We didn't have that. But they provided outstanding, probably the finest support that any Army in the field's ever received in Aviation maintenance. It was truly great. I think the maintenance in all other areas was good, sometimes exceptional. But it was not necessarily of the same level that we had when we were in the Aviation business.

CPT Barbuschak: Are there any other lessons-learned that you can think of from Vietnam?

LTG DeHaven: Oh, yes. All kinds. We had problem with Graves Registration. That's the problem in the Army today. We built up to a peak and by the time I was a group commander, I had 14 (Graves Registration units throughout the military region. They did a good job. I probably had are people in Graves Registration units in 1970 and 1971 in my group then you have in the entire Army today. But we are not prepared to do anything with our battle casualties in the field right now and it's unfortunate.

We talk about readiness. When you look at readiness, you think of maintenance, you think of spare parts, and you think of people's ability to perform their tasks. Well, all those are great. But then, look at the other side of the coin. If we had mobilization now, we could not have enough military clothing to clothe the individuals who are mobilized. We just don't have the facilities for it. We don't have enough shoes and boots to issue if we'd mobilize 250,000 people. I don't know what they'd wear to tell you the truth. The Reserve units would wear what they have. But within a week, we'd run out of everything. We don't have it; it's not available.

That's one of the little things. But people don' t pay any attention to that. 'They only look at the big-ticket items, such as the kind of trucks we have, tanks, and the aircraft that we have coming into our inventory. I think we've spent, a great deal of time and effort and money on those things. There's a place for them, but to the extent that we have advanced. I'm not sure we're ready for that.

We've only used the rotary-wing aircraft in Vietnam and that's a low intensity combat. We're investing billions in the Apache and other new helicopters. If we use them this time, it's going to be in high intensity combat. I wonder how long they're going to last. I've discussed this at every level that I've been on. Of course, the A7iators have shouted me down. They seem to think they can do it. Well, I hope they can. But I have some serious reservations. The war still has to be won by the guy that marches on the ground, not by the guy who flies around in a helicopter. We have done this partly in self-defense because I believe that the Air Force has been negligent in providing close air support to us that we desperately need on the battlefield. 'They've given the A-10. But how many of those do we have? 'The F-15 and the F-16 are not close air support aircraft. They're interdiction craft; they're not to provide for the soldier in the foxhole. I had the Air Force planner tell me, "What you want is an airplane for every soldier in every foxhole." I said, "That's about a good ratio."

CPT Barbuschak: The next subject is strategic mobility. The first question I have for you is, do you feel that the United States has sufficient strategic mobility capabilities today?

LTG DeHaven: I can answer that one question with "No!" We've made progress over the past 15 years. But I know our global commitments have changed. I think in airlift we do well. Sealift, of course, is a problem. But by purchasing the SL-7's [containership] over the past four years, their subsequent modifications has truly improved our capability. But everyone must understand that these ships are common user transportation and they are not committed to one force like the Marines would like to have. But I don't think we can afford to do that any longer. The concept that we have now with prepositioning shipping is not a new concept. We were doing that before the war in Vietnam. We had four ships prepositioned in the Philippines with equipment.

It was with this type of reasoning that we almost bought the fast deployment logistics [FDL] ship. It was more unique and larger than even the SL-7 and they were to be prepositioned. But in the 1968-69 period when the funding came along, even though we had had initial funding for the FDL, we had a very nervous Congress who were afraid we would become the policemen of the world. The program was killed by the budget ax.

The original procurement for the C-5 was much larger than the number that we bought. We should have had 3 are squadrons. We're getting those additional 50 now. But we need a replacement for the C-130. The C-130's lifetime is almost 30 years, although I don't know if we need another aircraft to replace the C-130. It's a fine gallant airplane and it does great in tactical airlift. The C-5 is as good a strategic airlifter as you could find for oversize and outsize equipment.

The C-141 is a fine airplane; probably the safest airplane in the world. If you look at the flying record of the C-141 Starlifter, it's the safest airplane that's ever flown. It's only had two accidents that I know of in the millions and millions of flying hours; one in Spain, and I believe there was another one in Turkey.

On the commercial side of the house, we got the CRAF [Civil reserve Air Fleet] program and the CRAF program provides almost unlimited aircraft that we could use in the event of a truly national emergency. Of the different phases that the CRAF comes under (I think there are four stages), we have never implemented any of those stages of CRAF because we haven't had to. We used civilian aircraft to get our people to and from Vietnam and that was by contract. People were more than happy to rent their airplanes to the Air Force's MAC [Military Airlift Command because they were getting a return on their dollar. So we've never implemented any of the stages of craft although there are four stages. But I think in a truly national emergency, we could get all the aircraft we need to move people and that wouldn't be any problem.

But to move people by air, you need destination airfields. You know in an active combat situation, especially in an area as small as Europe, we could very well be denied the airfields after the war starts. To move troops to Southwest Asia, the Middle East, there are airfields. But then you have tremendous distances within that central command area. People don't realize how far it is from Cairo west to Teheran or just in Saudi Arabia. There is a tremendous distance. Now we're getting 50 new C-5B's. They've restructured the wing program for the A-Models. So that should give us 30,000 additional hours of flying time. The B-Model will be well done.

The Air Force would like very much to have the C-17. The C-17 is as large as the DC-10 and the C-5 does exactly the same thing as the C-17. The main thing that they've talked about on the C-17 is delivery in a forward area. In the initial letter that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force wrote in the mission statement of the C-5, he said that it would have the ability to support troops in the forward areas. But they never tested the aircraft. It's got 28 wheels on it. You know it's not strictly a strategic airlifter. If that were true, it wouldn't have that reinforced wing like it has. That reinforced wing is so big and so heavy. It has created so many problems.

If you look at the wing on a DC-8 or Boeing 707, you will notice its wing is a different angle. It makes it fly faster and greater distances. But that wing was put on there along with all the other 28 tires so that it could land on a CBR [California Bearing Ratio] of 9. That's what a C-5 is supposed to be able to land in. But you see they've never tested it. The C-17 will offer new technology to the airlift business. It will not, however, be all that much different than the C-5B. We did the stretch on the C-141. We added, I guess, 138 inches to the central fuselage and increased the number of pallets that it can carry. But we do need some intra-theater airlift.

I'm on a mobility needs task force now with General Frederick J. Crossen, the former USAREUR Commander, and General William Dupuy, former TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] Commander. We're the Army representatives on that thing. I'm sorry. I forgot General Phillip Kaplin, who works for Lockheed, is on that committee along with a Marine lieutenant general and General Bill Moore, a former MAC [Military Airlift Command] Commander. We've also got a Tactical Air Command [TAC] individual, MG Ernie Bedke, who spent his entire career in fighters. And we've got a former commander of the Strategic Air Command [SAC] of the then 21st Air Force. We're trying

to look and see what we need in the way of tactical air of the future. It's a very interesting thing. We'll present that sometime next year to the Army and the Defense Department.

But mobility means more than ships and planes; it means ports, airfields; it means terminal service, terminal transfer units; it means the where-with-all to load and unload ships. We've got a long way to go before we ever get to an optimum condition that we would have enough. What is enough? We really don't know. But we do have a deterrent that is good and that deterrent is practiced on REFORGER [Return of Forces Germany] every year. That works. The 101st Airmobile Division was the first non-REF'ORGER unit that we sent to Europe by surface. We sent all their helicopters to Europe by surface and now they do it every year. It gives them some practice to load and discharge both in CONUS [Continental United States] and overseas. It works out very well. I guess REF'ORGER is going on right now.

CPT Barbuschak: You mentioned that we have plenty of aircraft to get the passengers over to a war or a conflict. How would we get the equipment over there?

LTG DeHaven: In Europe we have POMCUS [Propositioned Material Configured to Unit Sets]. They would like to go to five divisions' worth of equipment. But when you have POMCUS units, it really hurts you equipment-wise here in the States. Originally, it was a package two plus ten. We had the two divisions plus ten supporting units. I don't believe they have even funded for the Fifth POMCUS Division yet. But it's all to be prepositioned in Europe. I don't care what people say about the Southwest Asia or the Middle East. Our emphasis should be on NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and our close ties with our allies in Europe because we cannot afford to lose Europe. If we did that, we'll never get back on the Continent again. But we can always come to a stalemate and do something in Europe and then go the Middle East. Where if we went to the Middle East first and lost Europe, then we're all lost. So I think the grand strategist has resolved that problem. We do have some stuff prepositioned in the Middle East, but not in the same quantities that we have in Europe or in the Indian Ocean.

CPT Barbuschak: You've answered all my strategic mobility questions. Is there anything else you'd like to conclude on strategic mobility or mobilization in general?

LTG DeHaven: Strategic nobility includes more than the planes and the ships. One of the great shortcomings we have is right here in this country. This ought to be a great little project for some energetic captains in the Advanced Course. The class could do a mobilization exercise in their Advanced Course that would mobilize the Guard and F49serve units. At the same time those units are being mobilized, you're deploying active duty units from the same mobilization station. They will all be competing for the same transportation assets. Now who's going to get the transportation? The guy's mining to the port or the units coming on active duty. We've never thought that out too well. It's one of the big things that MG Henry R. Del Mar and MG Harold I. Small, commanders of MTMC [Military Traffic Management Command], are considering and working on.

Our rail system in the United States is terrible. It's just horrible because in a country like ours when we have freedom of movement, people have the freedom of choice where they own automobiles. When they want to go some place, they get in their cars and go. Passenger travel by train has gone steadily down. Whose fault? I say it is the rail owners - less profit in passenger travel. Amtrak has just had a horrible time operating the passenger rail system of this country. We need all in the event of mobilization. We will regret that we don't have a decent passenger service. Just like next week, my wife and I are going up to baby-sit for our granddaughter while my son and his wife are going on a skiing vacation out in Utah. And do you think they'll ride a train or drive a car out there? No. They'll fly on an airplane because they can get there fast and the cost is really not that much more. So that's the way they go.

But I'd like to see a mobilization exercise. I'd like to see JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] do a mobilization exercise of all the IL-serve units. I'm not talking just about the Army. I'm talking about the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. Everyone's going to compete for these transportation assets. You talk about organized confusion or regimented chaos, that is exactly what total mobilization would bring.

CPT Barbuschak: We have this TPFDL [Time Phased Force Deployment List] that everybody says is the grand plan for mobilization. Do you see that as being true?

LTG DeHaven: No, the TPFDL is just a TPFDL. That' s all. The TPFDL is the priority that the commander in the overseas theater wants when units arrive in his theater of operations. Now it's GEN Glen K. Otis in Europe [USAREUR]. Before that, it was GEN Frederick Crossen. Before that, it was GEN George S. Blanchard. Every two years, they would renew that 4102 Plan. With that would come the ' Time Phased Forced Deployment List. That's how the Commander wants those units to arrive in the country.

In 1976, when we established ALOC [Air Line of Communication], everyone was very upset because they didn't feel that the ALOC would provide them the support that they needed in wartime. I said, "Yes it does." It provides that because the Commander determines the priority that you want things to arrive. When the Theater Commander looks at that TPFDL, he has to determine what he needs to sustain an Infantry, Artillery, Quartermaster, or Air Defense unit.

If it is repair parts that have priority, then part of the 500 short tons are repair parts that arrive each day on the ALOC. But the Theater Commander makes that determination. We should give him the credit to say that he knows what he wants and this is how he is going to get it. The TPFDL is simply the order of priority the receiving Commander would like to receive.

But as I said, there's more to it than just flying from point A to point B. You've got to martial people by both ends, deploy them, receive them, put them aboard the aircraft, and fly them. When they land, they have to be Mt and disbursed. It's not an easy job. They have enough problems even in REFORGER.

CPT Barbuschak: As long as we're talking about Europe, I know they have some re-supply and movement plans that they are constantly refining for wartime. What problem do you see with re-supply or logistics in the European 'Theater?

LTG DeHaven: The Atlantic Ocean provides the most formidable one when you look at the amount of ammunition that we need to use every day with our forces on the ground. I am not sure about the percentage of ammunition requirement that we have in Europe. But I believe it's some where in the vicinity above 75 percent. That sounds like a reasonable figure for the average guy. But I'll tell you; it's a lot better than our allies have done because none of those are above 25 percent. That's the basic ammunition that we need to fight the war. I'm talking about artillery, small arm, ammunition, and all that's prestocked over there either in England, or Wales, or on the ground in Europe. I remember visiting the Second Support Command. I can't remember who the Commander was, whether it was Maxi Reddick or the guy that replaced him. I went out and visited all of the ammunition sites and the 101st Ordnance Battalion in the Second Support Command. I visited every one of those and saw they were all "chock-a block." But then you go all the way back to Miseau where you've got millions of tons of ammunition.

Maybe that's stretching the point a little bit, but that's the major thing. They do have an ammunition movement program in Europe. They can move by rail. People say, "Well, they've bombed that in the past," and I say, "That's all right." They've got a great inland waterway system and they've got a fine highway system. The only problem is that we don't have Army transportation to do all that. The Germans have got great transportation. With the Host Nation Support Agreements that we've got with the Germans, I don't visualize we'll have any problem of moving munitions. But our problems in Europe are the same ones that I discussed before: hospitalization, (Graves Registration, supply distribution, and fuel.

Ever since I've been involved in the fuel business, there have been some problems. There's no pipeline from Glanz to Bitburg. You build that pipeline in and you then have access to the entire Central European Pipeline System. Right now, it's just not available. They have to bypass it or truck fuel between those two points. We desperately need those 5,000-gallon tankers for retail re-supply up forward. So we've got some problems. One of our problems in Europe (and it's a scenario that we're working on in our Mobility Needs Task Force) is the logistics tail of all the countries in NATO goes all the way back to the national capital. They use the term; "Logistics is the National responsibility." That means from the United States, we are responsible all the way forward. Well, that's fine with our units in V and VII Corps. But what happens now when you've got the German Corps and the British up north and then we put the III Corps in up North? How do we re-supply those guys back and forth and hither? Distribution is going to be very difficult.

CPT Barbuschak: You mentioned POL [Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants] before. I've heard some estimates, especially in a European Theater where it's an urbanized terrain, that you'll be using four times the amount of fuel as opposed to ammunition. Is the Army taking all this into consideration in building up the fuel capabilities?

LTG DeHaven: We have the Central European Pipeline System [CEPS] over there which can provide enough fuel through its distribution points up front. It can provide almost all the fuel that we need once you pump it into the system. But the distribution from the end of the pipeline in the retail n-ode is very difficult. I made a trip to Europe this past summer in July and they're actively pursuing ways to distribute fuel. I'll be going back over there with Generals Crossen and DuPuy, probably some time this spring. We'll look at that same thing again because we're going to brief on some things that we've done. But we're using more and more fuel. Here we are with the M-1 Tank. It burns twice as much fuel as the M-60. So you can only be so mechanized.

CPT Barbuschak: It seems that the logistics system is becoming more and more computerized as time goes on. Do you see this as good or bad?

LTG DeHaven: We need some automation; however, automation for automation sake is not necessarily all that great. But we have to do something because we don't have the capability to hand-massage each little thing that we do in the way of a supply requisition. Automation, I believe, serves the Army well in everything, not just in the area of logistics. But we have an automated battlefield. In the integrated battlefield, automation is going to assist everyone. You can do a lot with a microlink coming back to CONUS from overseas rather than stick all those requisitions in a parcel and mail them back. We have made tremendous strides in my career in the Army. We have made are strides in the (I guess I've been retired almost a year and a half now) past year and a half than we did in the previous 35 years. In your lifetime or in your career in the Army, it's almost out of sight. It's beyond comprehension the things that we can do. Microchips and automation is the only major industry in the United States where the cost per item has gone down. It really costs us a lot less now to automate than it did 10 years ago. I think it's almost beyond comprehension to think of what you can do with automation. And, of course, you can always use the extremes like in the movie "War Games," but we've got some restrictions that are almost intolerable when you talk about things that we can and can't do.

CPT Barbuschak: What do you mean by restrictions?

LTG DeHaven: You know we've got some political restrictions with the Brooks Committee over in the Congress. We have to get everything approved by Jack Brooks. He's the guy that puts the thumb on everything because he looks at himself as the Czar of all these things. We're still in the second and third generation of automation. I have friends that work for IBM that are in the sixth and seventh generation. They're so far beyond us out in the real world that we could never catch up. But some time in a national emergency, they are going to be prepared to assist us and I think we can really go and do an excellent job.

CPT Barbuschak: What do you consider to be the major contributions to logistics over the past several years?

LTG DeHaven: We started the Army Materiel Command [AMC] back in the early 60S along with the Combat Developments Command. They were to be the user and the developer. But we never gave that outfit a chance to work because the war in Vietnam came along. GEN Frank S. Besson, who was then the Commander of the Army Materiel Command, couldn't wait. So he developed and did what he thought was best for the Army on a push system for the things that went to Vietnam. Now we have TRADOC, which is the user. But we just don't have enough work in the coordination between all the integrating centers to do that for equipment. It's getting better and better, but not too much.

I think we can look for some great improvements in automation now. It's taken us a long time to shake the cobwebs out of the trees. But I think with MG Richard H. Thompson, the current Commander of the Army Materiel Command, we can look forward to a pretty interesting period. He is probably one of the smartest logisticians that I have ever known. We have worked together both as directors in DCSLOG and we've been sort of friendly enemies. In fact, we're great friends. But we have never been afraid to say a few bad words to each other every now and then. I am sure he'll do a great job as the AMC Commander. The support system in the field is fine.

We've got a problem in the Transportation Corps. As I look to the future of the Transportation Corps right now, I don't see any future. We've lost the Aviation Logistics business that we were very good at. I'm talking about the Officer Corps and the enlisted personnel that are members of the Aviation business. I was against that. I made my feelings known to the Chief when I was still on active duty, but the Aviators won out. We don't need an Army Aviation branch. What we really don't need is to have someone prostitute an outstanding maintenance and supply system that has taken the Transportation Corps 30 years to work and develop. Now we have within the Army, a separate little Army called the Aviation Branch. They have their own clerks, drivers, and mechanics. All those people now belong to the Aviation Branch. When they wanted to take the Aviation Logistics people and put them in the Aviation Branch, I retorted, "When we organized the Armor Branch, we didn't take the maintenance folks away from Ordnance and put them into Armor. We didn't take the clerks and make them members of the Armor Branch."

I believe that it's taken a lot of hard work to develop the outstanding commanders that we've had in the Transportation Corps. I talk about people like MG [Aaron] Lilley, the Commander at Fort Eustis, the Commandant of the School; MG [Harold] Small, the Commander MTMC [Military Traffic Management Command]. I could go on and talk about all the other guys that we've got who have gone out. BG Eugene R. Lanzillo has been a DISCOM [Division Support Command] commander. He's now J-5 Deputy up in the Joint Staff. I could name all of those people. They're not all Aviators. But for every five people that we had selected as DISCOM [Division Support Command] Commanders, four of them were Aviators because they had such a great basic knowledge of supply and maintenance. Now they're 15 Tangos. I don't know what that mans. But we in the Transportation Corps now are saddled only with the household goods business and movement control. You can' t make a career out of that. You count

the number of officers that we have in the Transportation Corps now. You'll find there's only one branch that's smaller and that's Chemical Corps. That really is not worthwhile (if you want to make a career out of something) because people are aggressive. They want to look to the future to see what they can do and how they can make their contribution to the Army.

I think it was a real blow to the Army Transportation Corps when they took those folks away because it gave those people in the Aviation Logistics business an opportunity to expand. We've had some outstanding non-rated officers (non-aviation qualified) do all kinds of things and now they're going to be limited. Last I heard, they didn't have an opportunity to command the S&T battalions. We prostituted the Command structure now so badly that we give a guy command credit when he supervises a terminal activity that's got six people in it. But then he gets credit for command. Command is command, regardless whether you command a unit that's only got five people in it or 5000. You know you still have responsibility for the people that work for and with you. I really think that we're going to find out that in the next three or four years that there was a horrendous mistake made when they separated the Aviation logistics officers from that business. It took a second lieutenant coming on active duty that was Aviation designated one year before he went to the field. He went to the Basic Course. From there, he went to flight training. He ended up as rotary-winged and sometimes both rotary and fixed-winged. Then he came back to AMOC [Aviation Maintenance Officer Course] at the school and he's in TDY [Temporary Duty] status all this time. Then there is a little more training and then he goes to the field. That's almost a year before we've got any utilization, but he's trained well. We won't have that responsibility. MG Tilley won't have that responsibility, unfortunately. But we'll see what happens.

CPT Barbuschak: What other trends do you see in Transportation or logistics for the future?

LTG DeHaven: I can see all kinds of trends. We're going to have to rely a great deal more on the civilian community in the Transportation business. I believe that there's ways to get a great deal more from the civilian community than we are now, especially in the movement of household goods and people and equipment. But those are only my personal thoughts. I don't want to get involved in the details of those personal thoughts because it would look like that I am criticizing the people who are in the positions where they make the responsibility. I can make recommendations all the time and people can listen to them. If they don't want to do it, they don't have to do it. But I don't see anything by evolution. Why? I think we'll evolve into something I hope that's a little bit better than what we have right now.

CPT Barbuschak: Sir, is there anything you would care to add before we conclude this interview?

LTG DeHaven: I think if I try to review a 35-year history as an Army officer, I would go back to the good basic foundation that I think every Army officer needs. I've been blessed with a great wife. We've been married 36 years. We were married right after I

was commissioned. I've pulled and tugged her all over the world. She's made some pretty decent sacrifices. I think family life is very important. But for the last 23 years in the Army, I did not have an accompanied tour. I had two in the first 12 years, both in Europe. In between my last European tour in 1961 and my retirement in 1983, I had five short tours. As a matter of fact, I had three of them in a period of 5 years. That really doesn't do much for your family life. But I think maybe we're self-motivated because people try to second-guess everyone. It's not necessarily what's good for the Army, but you know it's what's good for me. People try to become their own career managers. I say that because I was in the personnel business. Of all the jobs I've had in the Army, the one I truly enjoyed the most was my position as the Chief of the Transportation Corps Branch in the Directorate of Officer Personnel because I could influence the careers of TC officers. I knew more about the Army officers in the Transportation Corps than many of them knew about themselves. I used to keep, on my desk, ten files that dealt principally with the Field Grade officers. When I had the spare time, I used to review those files and make notations in their insert cards.

Unfortunately, I was involved in three Army-wide reductions in forces [RIF]. I helped institute the plan where we started to RIF Regular Army officers, which had never been done before. We initiated it in 1972 because we were at the point where the quality of Reserve officers we were about to RIF was higher than the quality of some of the Regular officers that we had in the system. OOL Jim Worthen, the Chief of the Artillery Branch, and I got together and worked this plan out and made the presentation to the DCSPER [Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel] and the Chief of Staff of the Army. With our data, they went to the Congress and got a one-time exception. For the first time, Regular Army officers were included in a RIF.

We kept those Reserve officers who were just great guys. Some guys had stubbed their toes once but we were at that point. I' 11 never forget the time I had a captain come in to see me and he said, "I have a problem that I'd just like to discuss with you." I said, "Yes?" He said, "Last year I came up here to see my guy in the company grade assignments and he told me I ranked in the top third of all the officers in Transportation." I said, "O.K." He said, "This year I came back to see him and I received one efficiency report which is a max, truly outstanding. Here it is. This time he tells m I'm in the bottom third." He said, "Colonel, can you explain to me how that happened." I said, "Yes, we got rid of the lower 40 percent of all the officers in the Corps. So we have readjusted your standing. That's where your present position is." Unfortunately, it happens that way.

But I was fortunate in that during the period I went from a Lieutenant to a Captain, I received a Regular Army commission through what they called competitive tour selection. I was fortunate enough to work for good people as a Lieutenant. After I got my Regular commission, I worked for some old gruff World War II guys who were really great professional Transportation people. Also after receiving my Regular Army commission, I was detailed for two years into a Combat Arms branch.

I believe that it is a great mistake that we've done away with that requirement. It was there I learned how to function in a division. I served in both 82nd and 11th Airborne Divisions. I learned some of the very basic things that you need to know. In the first 10 years of my Army experience, I spent five years serving in Army divisions: three divisions in the States, and one division in Europe.

I first learned how to move a regiment and then how to move an entire division. I once told a division commander, simply, that I thought I could move his division better than anyone else if I had the communications. As a result of my brash statement, I moved a whole division one time, 160 miles. It really worked out well.

But it was during the same period up through the initial stages, people were all worried about command time. I've had people, when they mentioned command of units, to go into shock because they were just frightened. They didn't know what to do. To me, that was the glory time of my career because I commanded four companies and a detachment. That represents six and a half years of being a company commander. I used to even look forward to those AGI's [Annual General Inspections]. I knew quite a few people that just wanted to serve one year as a commander and then go on to something else. That's where you get your basic foundation in the Army. That's the only reason that you're a Captain and I'm a retired Lieutenant General. But it is our ability to command troops. You can command a company and I was selected to command a major logistics command. That's the reason lieutenant colonels command battalions, colonels command brigades, regiments, or groups, and major generals command divisions. That's the only reason that we have different ranks. It's not because some guy was a genius and figured out we go as officers from Second Lieutenant to four-star General. It's because the ability that you have over years of experience to command people. That' s the highest privilege anyone can receive. It's to get other people to do your bidding and do it willingly and try to make them enjoy it. They don't always enjoy it. But to have other people do your bidding and have them do it in a way that they feel is for the good of the organization (the Army and their country) I believe is the essence of command.

I was fortunate in that I served on a corps staff before I ever went to the Advanced Course. I served in VII Corps at Kelly Barracks, in the First Movement Control Center in the United States Army. That was back in 1954, 30 years ago. We didn't have TOE's [Table of Equipment for those outfits until 20 years later. I wrote a staff paper, when I was in the Advanced Course, about the use of radios in transportation companies. My adviser gave me an "F" on it. He flunked me because he said it was lousy and no one would ever consider giving us radios in transportation companies. But he could not see beyond the end of his arm. As I look back on that staff paper, it was pretty lousy. But it was based on some experiences that I had had. And of course, we all have radios now.

I've always been geared to the Army in the field where I've been the happiest. It worked out the best. I took a battalion headquarters to Vietnam that was totally unprepared to go. I took command of that battalion the middle of March at Fort Eustis. The unit had 59 people in it. We went to Vietnam at the end of June. I even had two people join that

battalion the day before we left. We went to the field three times and none of the people who were in the battalion when I took command deployed with us when we went to Vietnam. But we did a great job. We had some great officers, super soldiers, and they did a superb job. The finest officer I've ever known in the Army was a lieutenant that worked for me back as a platoon leader when I was a company commander. He was also the first commissioned officer killed in Vietnam in 1962. They have memorialized him by naming the Air Mobility Training building after him. It is now the Captain Terry D. Cordell [Citadel '57] building. Terry worked for me; a super, young guy geared the same way I was. We both felt and thought a great deal about the soldier and about things that we did in the Army.

But we've got a long way to go in the Army. I don' t necessarily agree with all the things the Army Chief of Staff [GEN John A. Wickham] is putting out. I think some of the things that he's stressing are those things that are intuitive to command, things that you should do. You don't have to have a written directive. You see that's all part of the command responsibility of the individual, the Post commander, the Group commander, the Battalion commander, the Company commander, and even the Platoon leader. I'll tell you; the biggest shock that they've ever had at Fort Eustis was four days after I took command. One night at 1800, I walked into a company's orderly room and told the CQ [Charge of Quarters] that I wanted to talk to the Company commander. It took the CQ until 2130 hours to find him. That never happened again. Unfortunately, too many people around here thought their workday started at 0700 or 0730 and they're finished at 1630 or 1700.

There's only one way on and one way off this Post and all the traffic has to go by the Post headquarters. One day at 1115, I was looking out of the window across to the School and there was a steady stream of cars on the outbound lane. So I asked the 'Transportation Engineering Agency down on Warwick Boulevard to put a counter out there because I'd like to know how many cars left the post between 1100 and 1200 and then between 1100 and 1300. It made me wonder where everyone was going when I learned that the count was over 5,000 cars. So then we tried to find out who the people were that were leaving and where they were going. We did a count and discovered the majority of them were Enlisted personnel that were going down to McDonald's, Wendy's, or some other fast food outfit. I found that strange because in our dining halls, we were feeding the very same fast food that they were going off Post to get. Have you been to 7th Group headquarters?

CPT Barbuschak: No, sir.

LTG DeHaven: I went down to see COL Jim Piner one day for just a visit. I noticed that sitting off behind his headquarters was a railcar sitting on some railroad tracks. I said, "Jim, what is that?" He said, "Well, it's been here for several years. They use it for a recruiting office and this, that, and the other thing." So I got a hold of the Engineer and I said, 'Why don't you make that thing into a diner?" Everyone told m it couldn't be done. So the next day I drove down. I was on my way home and I pulled into the 7th Group area and walked in to see Jim Piner. I said, "Jim, do you have an Engineering

company?" He said, "Yes, I have an Engineer port Construction Company." I said, "Why don't you have them draw up a plan to convert that railcar into a diner?" I said, "Only feed lunch and dinner there, you know, hamburgers, and salads." So we did. Once people found out I really meant that, that was what we wanted, well, we got all kinds of help. We got ridiculed by the Troop Support Agency [TSA] from Ft Lee. They told us, "Oh, you can't do that. The guys are eating four meals a day." I said, "Who really cares?" Well, we kept the people on the Post. We developed that thing. Have you ever seen the Resolute Express down there?

CPT Barbuschak: Yes, sir.

LTG DeHaven: That's the diner that they use. It's inadequate. But people line up there every day to go in there and get their hamburgers, fried chicken, roast beef, and French fries. It's a very popular spot. As a matter of fact, when the FORSCCM [Forces Command] Commander, GEN Robert Schoemaker, came up here, we took him over there for lunch. He said, "By gosh, I want one of these in every brigade area in the Army." Then we took a LAPC [Lighter Amphibious Re-supply Cargo] over at Fort Story and converted one of those into an outdoor eating facility. We also stopped the people from leaving the post for lunch. The head count didn't increase any. You could come in there if you'd been out on the town at night because we kept the place open late. If you wanted to get a hamburger, you could walk in there and show them your mal card and they'd give you a hamburger. Then they started to make pizzas, I guess, in the evening. But those things, when you look out for the welfare of the soldier, mans a lot are. He doesn't like to go eat in the mss hall. He'll eat there, but sometimes begrudgingly. But those are the happy days, I guess, you think about.

I have made the statement several times that we, in the United States Army, are not a very professional Army. I don't mean to impune the integrity or professionalism of individuals. But as an Army, we are not a very professional Army. Our policies change so fast concerning overseas tour, pay, and about uniform. The British Army uniform has basically stayed the same for 45 years and they're very happy with what they have. I sat as a member of the Army Uniform Board where people got in an argument over that black stripe that female officers wear on their trousers. I didn't feel that we should have spent more time discussing that black stripe than we did discussing the BDU [Battle Dress Uniform] that is what 95 percent of the Army wear. They don't wear the Class A uniform on a day-to-day basis.

When I first came to Fort Eustis, I found everyone wearing Class As. I appeared for my first day of duty, the day I took command of the installation, in fatigues. I had talked to MG Homer Smith, my boss at the LOGCEN [Logistics Center]. He said, "What uniform are you going to wear?" I replied, "Fatigues." He said, "Great!" So he came down in fatigues and he passed the flag to me. We had a cup of coffee, went back to the office, and then he left. Then the Chief of Staff came in and he asked, "Is this going to be the uniform of the day?" I said, "As far as I'm concerned, fatigues are the uniform of the day, to include the instructors in the school." I said, "It's what I think that we all should wear." I said, "Now I'm not saying you can't wear your greens because I'm going to have to

wear greens. I'll keep them here in the office because I've got commitments off the installation to which I wouldn't wear fatigues." I sort of felt out of place wearing fatigues to Rotary meetings. If you had to go give a speech some place, why don't you really want to go in your fatigues? People felt better, I think, because of that. But as I said, we spent more time discussing the black stripe on the women's trousers than we did about the new BDU uniform that the Army wears. I remember telling them then that it was the wrong weight and size. I said, "The best uniform we ever had was the jungle fatigues we wore in Vietnam. They are lightweight. If you want to put something else on, you can put it on underneath because the more layers of clothes that you have, the better off you are." Well, that's only one of the little things that we on the Army Uniform Board discussed all the time.

Talking about contributions that people make, I was able to change the Transportation position in DCSLOG. I established the Army Energy Office. I made the Chief the Director of Transportation, Energy, and Troops Support. In that position, he is also the Chief Executive Officer of the Army commissary system because the guy who runs the TSA [Troop Support Agency] works for him. I think if I did one thing during my tenure as DTRETS [Director Transportation Energy Training System], I started and almost completed the consolidation of the Army commissary system under TSA. I also came up with a different view on how we design uniforms. I helped broaden the base of the board and even changed the name of it. It is now named the Uniform and Equipment Board. We tried to save money. That's not easy and it is difficult to do. But we managed.

The one thing that I felt that I needed (and MG Aaron L. Lilley now has that responsibility) and that's his involvement in the selection of those officers (especially the Field (Grade officers), to key assignments worldwide and that's critical. We have, in many ways, ignored the divisions. I believe that the Division Transportation Officer [DTO] in every division should be a CGSC [Command and General Staff College] Leavenworth graduate. That gives them the maturity and hopefully, experience. It's the experience that really counts. You know as the DTO, you have to stand with your Combat Arms peers in a combat division and be recognized. The first thing you have to do in a division is establish yourself as someone who really knows what he's talking about. Once you've gained the confidence of the other staff members and the guys in the division, why you're in pretty decent shape. I think command is important. But it's not the overriding and most important thing.

Right now, the Transportation Corps is charged with developing the best Transportation Corps officer that we have. People used to really get upset when I said, "I don't believe a non-rated [non-aviator] officer should be a DISCOM Commander." That's because by background and training, that may be one in a hundred. He is prepared for that job because he has no experience in supply and maintenance unless he is an Aviator. But in commanding a truck terminal service or a boat battalion, you get involved in the periphery of supply and maintenance, but not in the nuts and bolts of it, and that's what counts. I think our Aviators are really involved in that. Unfortunately, other people don't feel that way.

I had so many people come up and say, "Oh, do you know, when you left, why this policy was changed and that policy was changed?" I said, "That's too bad. You know there are different strokes for different folks. Each guy operates in his own way. But as long as you have the integrity and the background and stand up for what you believe in, it all works out in the long run."

But I think if I were to look down in the future, I believe we made a great mistake, in the Army Aviation logistic business. But I think that'll come to rest at some point and they'll find out exactly what they have to do to rectify that mistake later on. Were I to go back over the 35 years of commissioned service that I had, I would not probably change anything that I did except I would pay a lot wore attention to my wife and my kids than I did. I'm very fortunate that I have a wife who is understanding. She was both father and mother to our children at many times. It's a career I've enjoyed. As my wife said, she couldn't possibly think of anyone who was less prepared for retirement than I was.